New Paper: The Method(s) of Cases

My latest paper, “The Method(s) of Cases” has just been published in Philosophical Psychology. No preprint up yet, but I’m happy to share a copy.

Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2020.1845309

Abstract

Experimental philosophy has focused attention on the role that intuitive responses to philosophical cases play in philosophical argumentation. The method of appealing to such cases has been dubbed the “method of cases,” and, in recent work, Edouard Machery has both defended its prevalence and uniformity in philosophical practice, and criticized its epistemic value. In this paper, I argue that there is no single method of cases, but rather a set of methods of cases. To defend this claim, I distinguish and articulate these different methods and argue that they better explain several paradigmatic appeals to cases. This result not only challenges the homogeneity of the method of cases; it also stocks our methodological toolbox with additional interpretive tools which help us to not only better understand philosophical arguments, but to better understand the significance of experimental work.